The chemical industry occupies a vital position in the national economy, serving as both a foundational and pillar sector. Chemical production processes are complex, involving hazardous chemicals that are flammable, explosive, toxic, or otherwise harmful; when accidents occur, they can be highly destructive and have significant societal repercussions. Ensuring the safety of hazardous chemicals is of paramount importance in workplace safety efforts. The Party Central Committee and the State Council attach great importance to this issue. In February 2020, the General Office of the CPC Central Committee and the General Office of the State Council issued the “Opinions on Comprehensively Strengthening Work on the Safe Production of Hazardous Chemicals,” and in April, the State Council’s Work Safety Commission released the “Implementation Plan for the Three-Year Special Rectification Campaign on the Safety of Hazardous Chemicals,” making a series of strategic decisions and arrangements to prevent and control major safety risks associated with hazardous chemicals and resolutely curb serious and extremely serious accidents.
From January to November 2020, a total of 127 chemical accidents occurred nationwide, resulting in 157 fatalities—down 16 incidents and 96 deaths compared with the same period last year, representing decreases of 11.2% and 37.9%, respectively. The overall workplace safety situation remained stable.
However, recent high-profile safety incidents have revealed serious shortcomings in some localities and enterprises, including an inadequate safety‑oriented development philosophy, weak rule‑of‑law awareness, a fragile safety infrastructure, low intrinsic safety levels, and gaps in safety management. As a result, the task of preventing and controlling major safety risks associated with hazardous chemicals remains daunting.
The Ministry of Emergency Management has emphasized that winter and the period around the year’s end are traditionally among the times when accidents involving the chemical industry and hazardous chemicals occur most frequently. Adverse weather conditions such as rain, snow, and freezing temperatures can adversely affect the operation of equipment and facilities as well as workers’ conditions. Moreover, rushing to meet deadlines and accelerating progress can lead to lapses in safety management and the accumulation of risks. All regions, departments, and enterprises must earnestly implement all measures to deepen rectification efforts and maintain and consolidate a sound safety record. Special inspections targeting ammonium nitrate and other explosive hazardous chemicals should be further strengthened, with targeted solutions—tailored to each enterprise—to effectively address pressing hazards such as excessive storage and non‑compliant inventory conditions. Comprehensive checks must be carried out to identify safety risks at oil and gas storage tanks, pipelines, terminals, and other critical facilities, and winter‑specific measures for frost and condensation prevention must be implemented to strictly prevent fires and explosions. Particular attention should be paid to the risks associated with relocation and upgrading projects; dedicated response plans must be developed for key installations and facilities, and during these processes, designated personnel should be assigned to monitor operations continuously, preventing unauthorized access or illegal production that could trigger accidents. Employees and the general public are urged to heighten their awareness of safety precautions and promptly report any violations of safety regulations, thereby jointly fostering an environment of oversight and collaborative governance.
To further encourage all localities, departments, enterprises, and the general public to draw profound lessons from accidents, firmly establish the concept of safe development, enhance public safety awareness, and ensure that all safety responsibilities are rigorously fulfilled, thereby effectively preventing and resolutely curbing serious and extremely serious accidents involving the chemical and hazardous‑chemical industries, the Ministry of Emergency Management has publicly released a series of typical cases of production safety accidents in the chemical and hazardous‑chemical sectors that have occurred since 2020.
1. The “February 11” explosion accident at Liaoning Xianda Agricultural Science Co., Ltd. in Huludao, Liaoning Province
At approximately 7:50 p.m. on February 11, 2020, an explosion occurred at the isoxaflutole production workshop of Liaoning Xianda Agricultural Science Co., Ltd., located in the Huludao Economic Development Zone in Liaoning Province, resulting in five fatalities, ten injuries, and direct economic losses of approximately RMB 12 million.
Cause: The operators in the enoxypropene production unit failed to verify and confirm the materials, mistakenly adding propionitrile to the chloroamine storage tank. This resulted in a reaction between propionitrile and chloroamine within the tank, releasing heat and causing thermal accumulation. As a result, the material temperature gradually rose, ultimately leading to decomposition and an explosion.
Key lessons: Liaoning Xianda Agricultural Science Co., Ltd. has inadequate safety production regulations and non-standard compliance, an underdeveloped emergency response mechanism for production incidents, insufficient safety education and training for employees, and unclear delineation of responsibilities among management personnel in the enoxyprop‑K workshop.
2. The “April 30” fire accident at Inner Mongolia Erdos Huaye Coal Coking Co., Ltd.
At approximately 8:30 a.m. on April 30, 2020, an explosion and fire occurred in Unit No. 2 of the electrostatic oil‑removal system within the chemical‑product recovery workshop of Huaye Coal Coking Co., Ltd. in Ordos City, Inner Mongolia, resulting in four fatalities and direct economic losses amounting to RMB 8.437 million.
Cause: While performing work on the top of Electrostatic Oil Collector No. 2, the operator violated safety procedures by failing to effectively shut off the gas supply, resulting in gas leakage into the interior of the unit. This gas‑air mixture became flammable and explosive, and an open flame generated during the operation triggered a deflagration.
Key lessons: Huaye Coal Coking Co., Ltd. has inadequate safety production responsibility systems, safety production rules and regulations, and operating procedures, with insufficient implementation. Prior to organizing inspections and maintenance of gas‑related equipment, the company failed to develop a dedicated inspection and maintenance plan, conduct a safety risk analysis, or obtain the required approval for special operations. Work scheduling for inspection and maintenance was unreasonable, resulting in overlapping tasks. Monitoring and alarm devices were not in proper working order and could not be used safely. Safety training and education were superficial, leading to low levels of safety awareness and competence among employees.
3. The August 3 flash explosion accident at Hubei Xiantao LanHua Organic Silicon Co., Ltd.
At approximately 5:39 p.m. on August 3, 2020, an explosion occurred at the methyltris(β‑ketoxime)silane workshop of Lanhua Organic Silicon Co., Ltd. in Xiantao City, Hubei Province, resulting in six fatalities and four injuries. The equipment involved had not undergone formal engineering design and was constructed and commissioned without proper authorization; the accident took place during trial production.
According to the preliminary investigation, the cause of the incident is: While cleaning accumulated liquid in the fractionation tower, the operator failed to completely discharge the butanone oxime hydrochloride from the bottom of the tower into the extraction process. As a result, a large quantity of butanone oxime hydrochloride entered the product neutralization unit along with the overhead clear liquid and was further fed into Settling Tank No. 1 for continued reaction. The heat generated by this reaction accumulated in the settling tank, which lacked temperature monitoring or cooling measures, leading to the decomposition and explosion of the butanone oxime hydrochloride. The accident investigation is still ongoing.
Key lessons: The operator failed to adequately identify safety risks, lacked sufficient awareness of the hazards associated with butanone oxime hydrochloride, and no operating procedures were in place.
4. The “9·14” poisoning accident at Shanxi Jinmao Energy Technology Co., Ltd. in Xiaoyi, Shanxi Province
At around 9:00 a.m. on September 14, 2020, a toxic gas leak and poisoning incident occurred at the VOCs treatment facility of Shanxi Jinmao Energy Technology Co., Ltd., resulting in four fatalities and one injury. In accordance with Shanxi Province’s coking industry policy, the company is slated for closure and phase-out.
According to the preliminary investigation, the cause of the incident is: Improper operation by personnel in the VOCs unit resulted in the discharge of acid‑wash tower waste liquid into the underground sump, followed by the release of alkaline waste liquid from the alkali‑wash tower into the same sump. The resulting reaction between the acidic and alkaline waste liquids generated hydrogen sulfide gas, which escaped and caused poisoning among workers. The accident investigation is still ongoing.
Key lessons: The accident‑prone enterprise failed to adequately identify safety risks associated with its VOCs control facilities, lacked sufficient operator expertise, and exhibited lax safety management as it approached closure and phase‑out.
5. The “9·14” poisoning incident at Gansu Zhangye Yaobang Chemical Technology Co., Ltd.
At 10:01 p.m. on September 14, 2020, a hydrogen sulfide gas poisoning incident occurred at the wastewater treatment plant of Zhangye Yaobang Chemical Technology Co., Ltd., located in the Yanchi Industrial Park of Gaotai County, Zhangye City, Gansu Province, resulting in three fatalities and direct economic losses of RMB 4.5 million.
Cause: On duty at the enterprise’s wastewater treatment plant, personnel violated operating procedures by rapidly adding hydrochloric acid to a wastewater pond containing high concentrations of sulfides for neutralization. This resulted in the rapid release of large quantities of hydrogen sulfide gas within a short period. Without wearing appropriate personal protective equipment, the on‑duty staff ventured into the hazardous area and inhaled a toxic mixture of high‑concentration hydrogen sulfide and other harmful gases, leading to poisoning.
Key lessons: The project’s environmental impact assessment documents were not reviewed and approved by the competent authorities in accordance with the law; nevertheless, construction was commenced and the facility was put into operation without authorization. The enterprise unilaterally altered its wastewater treatment process and method: while the original design called for neutralization in the wastewater‑neutralization workshop using a neutralization reactor, on September 11, 2020, it arbitrarily switched to neutralization in a wastewater‑treatment pond. Furthermore, the 15 potential hazards identified by experts on September 13, 2020, were not thoroughly rectified, constituting an illegal organization of trial production. In addition, the safety education and training system and safety management responsibilities were not implemented, and hazard identification and remediation remained incomplete.
6. The “9·28” explosion accident at Hubei Tianmen Chutian Biotechnology Co., Ltd.
At approximately 2:07 p.m. on September 28, 2020, an explosion occurred at Chutian Biotechnology Co., Ltd. in Tianmen City, Hubei Province, resulting in six fatalities and one injury.
According to the preliminary investigation, the cause of the incident is… : During a filter press test, electrostatic discharge ignited the decomposition and explosion of a hazardous material. The accident investigation is still ongoing.
Key lessons: The process technology employed in the explosive device originated in a coastal province. Following the reaction, the resulting materials were transferred to that region because their environmental treatment failed to meet regulatory standards. Unaware of the hazardous properties of these materials, the company conducted unauthorized trial operations, culminating in an explosion during the filtration‑pressing stage.
7. The “11·9” fire accident at Zhejiang Quzhou Zhongtian Oriental Fluorosilicone Materials Co., Ltd.
At approximately 11:17 a.m. on November 9, 2020, a fire broke out at Zhongtian Dongfang Fluorosilicone Materials Co., Ltd. in Quzhou City, Zhejiang Province, engulfing an area of about 2,000 square meters. Although no casualties were reported, the incident had a significant social impact.
According to the preliminary investigation, the cause of the incident is: At the accident‑site’s No. 3 storage yard, a leak occurred from methylchlorosilane high‑boiling‑point material stored in ton drums. Operators neutralized the leaked material with hydrated lime powder and transferred the neutralized mixture into plastic woven bags. However, the lime continued to react with the high‑boiling‑point material, generating heat and accumulating (as methylchlorosilane high‑boiling‑point material reacts violently with moisture and alkalis, releasing heat), which caused the mixture and the woven bags to ignite and burn. The fire then spread to nearby ton drums, resulting in a large‑scale release of high‑boiling‑point material and an expansion of the area affected by the blaze. The accident investigation is still ongoing.
Key lessons: The accident‑prone enterprise exhibited weak safety and legal awareness, illegally using a Class C warehouse to store Class A hazardous chemicals. Operators lacked adequate safety knowledge, were unaware of the hazardous properties of high‑boiling methylchlorosilane fractions, and blindly employed slaked lime powder for neutralization.
8. The “11·17” explosion accident at Jiangxi Ji’an Haizhou Pharmaceutical and Chemical Co., Ltd.
At approximately 7:21 a.m. on November 17, 2020, an explosion occurred at Haizhou Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., Ltd., located in the Futan Industrial Park of the Jinggangshan Economic Development Zone in Ji’an City, Jiangxi Province, resulting in three deaths and five injuries.
According to the preliminary investigation, the cause of the incident is: The waste liquid of p‑toluenesulfonamide processed in Reactor 303 contained the solvent benzene chloride. Operators used a vacuum pump to transfer the material to Reactor 302; however, since Reactor 302 had just completed distillation of the previous batch and had not yet cooled down, the benzene chloride in the waste liquid heated up and formed an explosive gas. During the transfer process, static electricity generated an ignition source, leading to an explosion. The accident investigation is still ongoing.
Key lessons: The principal person in charge of the accident‑causing enterprise demonstrated a weak safety awareness and failed to fulfill their statutory duty to organize the development of operating procedures for waste‑liquid treatment. They also lacked an adequate understanding of the safety risks associated with the waste‑liquid treatment process, failing to conduct a risk assessment or implement appropriate control measures. Furthermore, they did not rigorously enforce the change‑management system, arbitrarily using idle equipment and facilities to distill waste liquids.
Source: Ministry of Emergency Management
