The most in-depth and practical analysis to date of the “3·21” explosion accident in Xiangshui (a three-part compilation by safety expert Su Zhenyu)

The March 21 explosion at Jiangsu Xiangshui Tianjiayi Company resulted in the tragic deaths of more than 70 people. The incident has drawn close attention from national leaders, and even United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres issued a statement on the UN’s official social media account, expressing deep sorrow over the heavy toll of casualties.

The cause of this accident is still under investigation. What will it leave us with? Dozens of grieving families, a handful of people behind bars, or yet another wave of safety inspections? If we stop at these measures, we will inevitably face another “Xiangshui explosion”—perhaps even one every year or every few years.

At a forum in 2007, someone asked me about the outlook for chemical safety in China. I replied that the prospects were not very optimistic and that we might face catastrophic major accidents every year. My reasoning was that, although China’s chemical industry has already grown to the largest scale in the world, our national approach to chemical safety management—and our technical capabilities—remain at an early stage. While the aspiration to completely eliminate major accidents is understandable, in reality it is extremely difficult to achieve at this juncture; indeed, over the past few years, we have experienced numerous large-scale incidents.

The government, including its top leaders, has demonstrated an unprecedented level of commitment and resolve to prioritize and strengthen safety measures, seemingly leaving no stone unturned. Yet why have such catastrophic accidents still not been eradicated? Many are searching for answers. In my view, the current state of safety in the chemical industry—and the underlying problems—are not confined to a single issue; rather, they reflect a systemic challenge, stemming from decades of weak safety‑management foundations that have failed to keep pace with rapid industrial growth. Occupational safety itself is a complex interplay of management and technology—it is a science—but we often fall into the trap of addressing symptoms rather than tackling root causes.

Following the Tianjin August 12 explosion, public reaction has been one of “shock.” It is our sincere hope that this tragedy will prompt all stakeholders—government agencies, industry associations, consulting firms, universities, and manufacturing enterprises—to reflect deeply on lessons learned, identify pathways for sound regulatory oversight and effective operational practices, and prevent similar accidents in the future. We can expect that, before long, numerous organizations will convene symposiums, and many experts will offer recommendations and policy proposals. Here, I would like to begin by sharing some preliminary thoughts, which I hope will spark further discussion. This analysis will be presented in three parts: the first examines how governments can strengthen safety governance; the second explores the roles of industry associations, consulting firms, and academic institutions; and the third focuses on the responsibilities of manufacturing enterprises.

This is the first installment, the government section.

Judging from the directives issued by national leaders over the past few years, the steady stream of new regulations, and the mounting pressure faced by officials at all levels, it is clear that the government places utmost importance on workplace safety—and has left no stone unturned in its efforts. Yet, despite seemingly exhausting its policy toolkit, the safety situation in the chemical industry remains far from satisfactory (though, to be fair, progress is undeniably evident).

The government is deeply anxious, conducting one round of safety inspections after another—especially during major events—but why are the expected results still elusive?

Imagine this: Could a government‑led team of a few experts, after a cursory inspection of a factory, really identify the root causes of problems and prescribe a foolproof solution? As professionals in the field well know, when it comes to complex systems like chemical plants, no matter how much experience or expertise one brings to bear, a superficial walkthrough will at best reveal only surface‑level issues—such as inadequate static‑grounding, improper storage of chemicals in certain areas, missing signs and labels, insufficient safety distances, employees failing to wear personal protective equipment, or inadequate fire‑fighting equipment. Even if you were to summon the world’s top experts and conduct a quick, perfunctory review, the outcome would likely be much the same.

I visited a large chemical enterprise where local safety‑supervision officials conducted inspections three to four times a week. As a result, the plant’s management personnel abandoned their regular duties and spent their time merely going through the motions, effectively just putting up with the inspections. The local safety‑supervision officers’ intentions were undoubtedly good—they were concerned about preventing accidents and carried out their work with great diligence and care. However, sporadic inspections are, in practice, of very limited effectiveness. The Tianjiayi Chemical Plant involved in this accident must have undergone countless safety inspections as well.

It’s not that we should eliminate safety inspections; essential safety checks are indeed an integral part of oversight. However, the frequency, scope, and depth of these inspections must be scientifically planned. From the government down to individual organizations, we must recognize that the actual implementation of safety management must be carried out by the enterprises themselves. While safety inspections and fragmented hazard‑identification efforts can offer some assistance, they cannot substitute for a systematic approach to safety management. (To be continued)

This article is compiled from Wenran Academy; author: Su Zhenyu