After fierce competition in the agrochemical industry, who will emerge as the survivor? Only by grasping the underlying logic can companies achieve lasting success.

Societal functioning always follows certain patterns and is underpinned by extensive causal relationships—complex, intricate, and often difficult to discern. All too frequently, it resembles the parable of the blind men and the elephant: those who feel the belly conclude the elephant is like a wall; those who touch the leg deem it a pillar; and those who grasp the ear imagine it a fan. This holds true not only for society at large but also for specific industries—and the agrochemical sector is no exception. When one’s vantage point is too low or too close, one can only perceive fragments, easily generalizing from limited observations and arriving at flawed conclusions. Only by stepping back, adopting a broader perspective, and sifting through the dense web of cause-and-effect can one uncover the underlying logic. Though such foundational principles may be few, they serve as the guiding “framework”; only by grasping this core logic can one truly understand the essence of the industry.

01

What deeper implications are embedded in the offhand remark, “Pesticides are an essential factor of production in agriculture”?

Pesticides are an essential input in agriculture—a point so well‑known that it often goes without question. Yet familiarity with this fact does not mean we can afford to stop thinking. The greatest truths are often the simplest; by seeking the “great way” in simplicity, and by acting in harmony with nature, we can secure both survival and sustainable development—this is the proper path.

1.1 Agriculture determines the primary demand in the pesticide market.

The methods of agricultural production, cropping patterns, environmental conditions, and the incidence of crop diseases, pests, and weeds all determine the demand for pesticides and the composition of the product portfolio. Meeting agriculture’s needs is not achieved through administrative mandates—no level of government or individual leader dictates which specific products must be purchased. Instead, it is driven by market competition: the pesticide company whose products best satisfy agricultural requirements will enjoy strong sales, a larger market share, and greater profitability, thereby securing a more favorable position in the marketplace.

1.2 Pesticides are agricultural inputs.

The role of inputs is primarily manifested during the production process; their characteristics, performance, attributes, and quality are not reflected in the final product, nor do they establish a direct connection with consumers. As a result, consumers generally do not develop any specific preferences for them—for example, electricity or coal. Inputs typically exhibit weak brand characteristics. By contrast, products with strong brand identities not only convey assurance of quality but also, more importantly, satisfy consumers’ psychological need for “vanity,” such as high‑end baijiu, cosmetics, and automobiles. While superior product quality is certainly important, what matters even more is the status symbol these products project—consumers often perceive that purchasing them signals a “high‑end, sophisticated, and premium” image. Consequently, products with strong brand power command higher price premiums, whereas those with weak brand power carry lower markups. As agricultural inputs, pesticides have three distinct features: First, they possess a weak brand effect; no one feels particularly proud or self‑confident simply by buying a particular pesticide brand. In today’s pesticide market, some companies even register multiple brands for a single product—a practice that, from a competitive standpoint, amounts to mere mimicry and serves no real purpose. Second, consumers ultimately focus on the quality of the pesticide itself. Because most manufacturers employ uniform quality‑control systems, their products tend to be consistent in quality. As a result, consumers often place greater emphasis on the manufacturer’s brand than on the specific product brand, and the price premium for branded products is usually modest. Accordingly, for any given pesticide, competition largely hinges on price, with consumers gravitating toward lower‑priced options. Third, the state of the agricultural market significantly influences both the demand for and the pricing of pesticides. To take an extreme example, a few years ago, in a certain area of Guangxi, the oversupply of Wogan oranges caused prices to plummet. From an economic perspective, farmers opted to reduce—or even eliminate—pesticide applications altogether. When farmers cut back on or forego pesticide use, demand for the corresponding pesticide formulations naturally declines, leading to lower prices.

1.3 The characteristics of agriculture determine or influence the characteristics of pesticides.

This is manifested in three ways: First, the regional nature of agriculture gives pesticides a distinct regional character. Unlike industry—where products can be standardized globally without regional variations—agriculture exhibits pronounced regional differences: water, fertilizers, soil, and climatic conditions vary from place to place; the crops best suited to each area differ; and the pests, diseases, and weeds that arise are not uniform. Consequently, the types of pesticides required also vary. Second, the diversity of agriculture dictates the diversity of pesticides. With a wide array of crop species, numerous pest and disease pressures, and a rich variety of ecological environments, the range of pesticide formulations is extensive, with highly refined product segmentation. Third, the seasonality of agricultural production imposes a corresponding seasonal pattern on both the manufacturing and marketing of pesticides.

Businesses seek to identify which products remain in short supply, particularly when the market is generally oversupplied—after all, scarcity signals demand. So where should one look for such shortages? Fundamentally, the search must follow the “demand” axis: wherever there is demand, there is a market. Ultimately, the answer lies in agriculture. From three perspectives, there is still considerable room for growth in agriculture’s demand for pesticides.

First, there is the pressing need arising from agricultural structural adjustments. For example, this includes the use of crop protection products for minor‑crop production, as well as formulations for off‑peak market launches and for storage‑based preservation. These demands are very real: because the volume of each individual minor crop is small, some companies simply do not bother to conduct trials or seek registration. However, “small” and “large” are relative; once the major crops have all been registered and the market has reached saturation, the smaller ones naturally become more significant, thereby increasing their market appeal. When drought strikes, we certainly hope for a heavy, cleansing rain—but even a light drizzle can be beneficial.

Second, there is a growing demand driven by advances in agricultural production technologies. Practices such as protected‑field farming, drone‑based spraying, and soil fumigation all require more suitable pesticides. This does not mean that no products are available; rather, the market lacks formulations that are more targeted and better suited to these specific applications. With the market approaching saturation, manufacturers typically seek out niche demands after addressing broad‑category needs, developing new, highly tailored products to meet these specialized requirements and capture greater market share. The same principle applies to crop protection: because facility agriculture, drone spraying, soil fumigation, and integrated seed‑pesticide systems each present unique application challenges, companies will inevitably focus on these areas, leading to the emergence of dedicated, purpose‑built products.

Third, there is the potential demand of the future—such as nano‑pesticides, the large‑scale cultivation and application of biotech‑bred crops, and RNA‑based biopesticides. At the current pace of agricultural development, these future needs will soon translate into actual market demand. As the saying goes, “prepare an umbrella on a sunny day,” and forward‑thinking entrepreneurs should begin making preparations well in advance.

02

Why impose strict regulations on pesticides?

Speaking of this issue, we must first ask why Sun Wukong was subjected to the Tightening Hoop. Endowed with extraordinary powers and hailed as the Great Sage Equal to Heaven, he accompanied Tang Sanzang on his journey to the West to obtain the sacred scriptures, vanquishing demons and eradicating evil along the way and earning countless merits. Yet Sun Wukong possessed both divine nature and beastly instincts: when his divine side emerged, he slew demons and banished harm; when his beastly side took over, he ran wild, heedless of law or order. By having the Tightening Hoop placed upon him, he was compelled to dutifully slay demons and eliminate threats, daring not to act recklessly.

Pesticides are like Sun Wukong—possessing extraordinary powers, yet prone to acting on a whim. Used wisely, they can cure diseases, control pests, and weed out unwanted plants, ensuring stable food supplies and benefiting society; used unwisely, they harm the environment, jeopardize the safety and quality of agricultural products, and inflict damage on society. Unlike ordinary commodities, which are unremarkable and require no special oversight, pesticides are a special category: powerful but capricious. To ensure that pesticides serve as angels, bringing benefits to humanity rather than devils wreaking havoc, we must impose strict controls—human ingenuity is more than capable of taming both their angelic and devilish sides.

The first regulatory hurdle is the pesticide registration and review system. Before a new pesticide can be launched, it must undergo safety‑assessment trials conducted by nationally accredited testing facilities, and the resulting data and supporting documentation must be submitted to a specialized national agency for review. Only after passing this review may the pesticide be registered and issued a “certificate of registration.”

The second “tightening spell” is the phase-out regime for highly toxic pesticides. Pesticides that are highly toxic, leave persistent residues, and pose risks to environmental health and the safety of agricultural products will no longer be approved for use—effectively amounting to a “life sentence.”

The third restrictive measure is the pesticide production licensing system. In addition to meeting other statutory requirements, pesticide manufacturers must obtain a production license issued by the provincial agricultural and rural affairs authority before they are permitted to engage in production.

The fourth restrictive measure is the pesticide business licensing system. Operators must meet prescribed requirements to obtain a pesticide business license; for restricted-use pesticides, even stricter conditions must be satisfied to secure a license for their sale and distribution before they may commence operations.

The fifth restraining spell is the system of rational pesticide use. Pesticide applications that exceed approved scopes or dosages will be subject to corresponding penalties.

Five stringent regulatory measures tightly confine the life and death, production, marketing, and use of pesticides within a strict framework; once subjected to these controls, pesticides can only dutifully serve humanity.

The essence of the “tightening‑hat spell” is a set of limited regulatory measures applied to specific industries—necessary steps taken to foster constructive outcomes while curbing destructive ones, not to stifle them entirely. If an industry were to die out or cease to exist, then regulation would no longer be needed. It is important to emphasize three points: First, regulation must be proportionate; interventions that are unnecessary, or that yield short‑term benefits but long‑term harm, should be avoided. For instance, when Sun Wukong was pinned beneath Mount Wutai by the Buddha, he did not require the tightening‑hat spell; it was only when he accompanied Tang Sanzang on the journey to the West that the spell was imposed. Moreover, the spell was not invoked daily—it was used only when there was a risk of jeopardizing the mission to obtain the sacred scriptures. Second, regulatory policies should be adjusted gradually in response to socio‑economic developments. Since the reform and opening‑up, China’s pesticide‑management regime has become progressively stricter, driven by our enhanced capacity to ensure safe pesticide use and by rising public expectations for agricultural product quality and environmental protection. Such incremental adjustments facilitate adaptation by both the industry and society; just as one eats one bite at a time, reforms should proceed step by step. Attempts to achieve rapid, sweeping change—whether by trying to “eat a whole pig in one bite” or by demolishing old buildings to erect new ones—only lead to chaos. Third, regulation entails costs. Enterprises, society, and government all bear significant expenses. If the positive externalities generated by regulation fail to offset these costs, such measures amount to ineffective or excessive control. On the subject of regulation, let us consider a practical issue: Some argue that cutthroat market competition is extremely harsh, consuming vast social resources. Could we temper this dynamic by tightening management of production licenses—perhaps by reducing or restricting their issuance—to cool down an already oversupplied pesticide market? The intention behind this proposal is commendable: Unrestrained, bottomless competition inflicts severe damage on the industry, often driving product prices below cost, squandering valuable resources, and stifling investment in research and development, thereby constraining industry growth. However, seeking to further intensify the heat in an already brutal competitive environment by curtailing production licenses or imposing capacity controls may not be the right approach. Our current economic system is a socialist market economy, which places decisive emphasis on the market’s role in resource allocation. Decisions about whether, where, and what to invest are left to market participants. In contrast, the former Soviet Union and pre‑reform China adopted planned economies, motivated by concerns that excessive market competition led to overcapacity and resource waste, necessitating central planning. The outcome is well known: While overcapacity was indeed addressed, producers lost motivation, shortages emerged, and many essential consumer goods had to be rationed through coupons. As a result, the planned economy proved unsustainable, and after the reform and opening‑up, a market‑oriented framework had to be introduced. Excessive government intervention in any sector is counterproductive. When overcapacity arises, the government can issue timely policy warnings or disclose relevant capacity data, allowing market actors to decide, based on this information, whether to reinvest or resume production.

What impact will the regulatory measures—akin to a tightening noose—have on the agrochemical industry? It is undeniable that these measures will increase companies’ costs, whether through the need to conduct additional field trials for registration or the investment required to meet the conditions for obtaining licenses. However, the positive effects on the industry are equally evident.

First, it is about enhancing the industry’s reputation. In 1962, American marine biologist Rachel Carson published “Silent Spring,” which depicted how a once idyllic, harmonious town—filled with fragrant blossoms and the songs of countless birds—had been transformed into a valley of death due to the destructive effects of chemical pesticides and industrial pollution: the flowers had vanished, the birds were gone, and the vibrant spring had fallen silent. The book sparked an enormous public outcry in the United States and around the world, with widespread condemnation of the pesticide industry. Fortunately, humanity eventually devised regulatory measures to rein in the industry, curbing its harmful impacts, and gradually restored its credibility—so much so that today, while there may still be some criticism, it no longer threatens the broader picture.

Second, it promotes orderly competition within the industry. Without effective oversight, some enterprises may run rampant and act with unchecked recklessness, provoking widespread public resentment and undermining the sector’s integrity. This could lead to a “bad money drives out good” dynamic, plunging the pesticide industry into a self‑destructive cycle of cutthroat competition.

Third, a competitive moat has been established. The registration and licensing regime imposes certain barriers to entry in the agrochemical sector, making it difficult both to enter and to operate within the industry. Once established, this barrier naturally creates a protective moat. With such a moat in place, competition is largely confined to the industry itself; external players seeking to break into the market face additional hurdles, which benefits incumbent agrochemical firms.

03

Why is pesticide use always a topic of discussion?

I often hear colleagues in the agrochemical industry say that public opinion toward pesticides is unfavorable—there’s a tendency to treat them as if they were dangerous and to react with apprehension at the very mention of them—and they express deep concern and some frustration about this. Is the negative public perception of pesticides an objective reality, or are there other underlying factors? Is it due to inadequate communication, or does it stem from the inherent dynamics of public discourse? If the problem lies in insufficient outreach, we can certainly work to improve it; but if it reflects the natural ebb and flow of public sentiment, there’s no need to overreact or to cultivate an overly sensitive, fragile “glass heart” that constantly hesitates and falters. Alternatively, we might both strengthen our communication efforts and maintain a calm, balanced perspective.

3.1 “Talking about matters” follows a pattern.

Public opinion follows its own patterns; what we need to do is recognize these patterns, master them, and respond effectively—rather than ignoring or dismissing them and blaming external factors. First, issues that directly affect everyone tend to attract attention. Compared with the defense industry, pesticides are vastly different in both importance and economic scale: the latter is far removed from everyday life, and except for enthusiasts, most people pay little heed to its development. By contrast, everyone needs to eat, and pesticide residues are inextricably linked to our food, drinking water, and living environment—concerns that touch us all. As a result, even minor incidents involving pesticides often get blown up into widely known events. Second, the unusual and unexpected draws more attention. As a famous journalistic adage goes: “A dog biting a person isn’t news; a person biting a dog is.” Routine matters fail to capture public interest, while extraordinary occurrences readily draw it. In a country as large as ours, where pesticides are used every day, society generally overlooks their safe application—but even a single case of harm can grab headlines and spread rapidly. Third, past incidents leave lasting impressions. In a classroom, some students may have a history of mischief or misbehavior, later reforming. Yet when something negative happens, teachers and peers often associate it with those “troubled” students. Similarly, in social behavior there is a well‑known concept called the “Tacitus Trap”: once a government agency or organization loses public trust, whether it tells the truth or lies, does good or bad, its words and actions will be interpreted as dishonest or harmful. Pesticides, with their historical record of reckless use leading to severe harm—even today, occasional cases still surface—have fostered a widespread public skepticism toward those who were once seen as “problem children.” Fourth, “finding fault” is a fundamental habit and right of consumers in a market economy. As the saying goes, “Praise and criticism are the lifeblood of business”—when purchasing goods, it is perfectly natural for consumers to offer both praise and critique. From a broader perspective, consumer demands serve as a powerful driver for industry improvement. This holds true across all sectors—including agriculture and the pesticide industry.

3.2 You must present the “matter” clearly and effectively.

We must comprehensively summarize and clarify the role of pesticides in order to conduct targeted outreach. First, they safeguard food security: no matter how loudly certain groups or individuals tout “returning to ancient agriculture,” “traditional farming,” or “organic agriculture,” humanity would still struggle to feed itself adequately without pesticides. Our neighbor Sri Lanka once banned chemical fertilizers and pesticides, only to see food prices soar—delivering a harsh lesson that forced it to reverse course. Second, pesticides have helped liberate rural labor. This point is seldom highlighted, yet decades ago weeding was almost entirely done by hand, and pest control relied on manual labor as well. With modern pesticides, only minimal human effort is required, freeing up rural workers. While everyone recognizes that modern agricultural machinery has liberated humanity, few realize that pesticides have similarly freed rural labor—even those within the pesticide industry often fail to appreciate this, let alone promote it; so how could society at large be aware? Third, pesticides protect environmental health and public hygiene. The Regulations on Pesticide Administration explicitly include “preventing mosquitoes, flies, cockroaches, rodents, and other harmful organisms” within the scope of pesticides, commonly referred to as sanitary‑use products. Mosquitoes, flies, cockroaches, and rodents transmit pathogens and spark epidemics; once dubbed the “Four Pests,” controlling these pests and protecting the environment depends on pesticides. According to the World Health Organization’s 2021 Global Malaria Report, in 2020 there were 241 million malaria cases worldwide, resulting in 627,000 deaths, with over 90% of cases occurring in Africa. Since 2001, among the 663 million malaria cases that have been successfully reduced, 69% can be attributed to the use of insecticide‑treated bed nets, while another 10% stems from indoor residual spraying. Data show that between 2001 and 2010, the increased use of insecticide‑treated bed nets prevented the deaths of 842,800 children in malaria‑endemic regions around the world.

3.3 Approach “discussing matters” with a calm and balanced mindset

As a commodity that directly affects people’s food and livelihoods, pesticides naturally attract scrutiny and mixed reviews from consumers. It is essential to approach the management of pesticides with the mindset of “not seeking universal praise every day, but ensuring they remain indispensable to all.” At the same time, we must further strengthen public outreach to highlight the role of pesticides and the achievements of their development, helping the general public understand that just as humans need medicine when ill, crops also rely on protective treatments to stay healthy; neglecting such care can lead to worsening diseases or even crop death, while failing to use pesticides can result in reduced yields or even total crop failure. In short, taking medicine benefits human health, and applying pesticides benefits crop health.

04

Who will survive the fierce competition in the agrochemical industry?

At present, the pesticide market suffers from severe overcapacity. Through market competition and corporate mergers, the number of pesticide firms will decline significantly—a consensus widely shared and consistent with the general principles of a market economy. A key concern is: what outcomes will competitive pressures produce, and what kind of industry structure will emerge? Will the sector, like the household appliance and automotive industries, evolve into a landscape dominated by a few major oligopolists, with smaller and medium-sized enterprises serving as suppliers of raw materials or component parts to these leading players? Simple comparisons can easily lead to misjudgments; a case-by-case analysis tailored to each specific sector is essential. Unlike the automotive and home‑appliance industries, the pesticide sector will likely see the emergence of several oligopolistic firms, alongside small and medium‑sized enterprises that supply them with raw materials and component parts, while also maintaining a contingent of independent, specialized SMEs. Why do such SMEs persist in the pesticide industry? This is largely determined by the unique characteristics of the pesticide sector itself—and, by extension, by the nature of agriculture.

First of all, the agrochemical industry is highly fragmented. To facilitate our explanation, let’s use the relatively less fragmented household automobile sector as a point of comparison. In the automotive industry, whether at the high end or the low end, there is no fundamental difference in function or utility; the distinctions lie only in equipment and comfort levels. A defining feature of this sector is exceptionally fierce market competition, with firms vying on price, marketing, and economies of scale. As a result, the market increasingly concentrates among leading, advantaged companies, driving up industry concentration and giving rise to oligopolistic market structures. Today, virtually every driver can name several well-known automakers, because only large, well‑branded enterprises that have survived the brutal competitive environment remain prominent. By contrast, the agrochemical industry is characterized by an abundance of plant species and a wide array of pests, diseases, and weeds, each requiring specific active ingredients. Even within the broad category of “agrochemicals,” products differ significantly in their functions and applications. China’s agrochemical market encompasses more than 700 active ingredients and over 45,000 registered formulations currently in use. This extreme degree of product differentiation creates natural barriers for certain small and medium‑sized enterprises that excel in particular niche segments, enabling them to become leaders within their sub‑sectors and posing challenges to larger firms seeking mergers and acquisitions. Consequently, these specialized players are often able to withstand intense market competition and maintain their positions.

Furthermore, agriculture exhibits pronounced regional characteristics. Agricultural production depends on specific environmental conditions—such as climate, topography, soil, and water resources—and, unlike industrial production, it is highly localized. These regional factors influence the selection of pesticide varieties, application rates and methods, and even impose special requirements. Consequently, certain pesticide companies that serve particular agricultural regions are able to sustain their operations.

In summary, pesticide companies that can sustain long-term viability generally fall into the following categories:

One category comprises large, internationally operating agrochemical companies. These firms enjoy clear economies of scale and possess substantial advantages in new‑product R&D, cost control, channel development, and brand building.

The second category comprises low-cost raw-material suppliers. These companies primarily supply active pharmaceutical ingredients or raw materials to leading firms under contractual agreements, leveraging their cost‑advantage to earn modest profits.

The third category comprises proprietary‑product manufacturers. Although these companies are not particularly large, they maintain a focused business strategy with clearly defined target markets and place a strong emphasis on applied R&D. Their products are tailored to specific crops, diseases, weeds, or production stages, ensuring high product concentration. While their overall scale may lag behind that of larger firms, they hold a commanding position within their respective sub‑sectors, effectively becoming “hidden champions.”

The fourth category comprises integrated service providers that serve specific regions. Their product portfolios are largely confined to particular areas, with a focus on serving those locales rather than pursuing broad geographic expansion at the expense of shallow market penetration or sporadic, low‑yield operations. Instead, they adopt a steady, methodical approach—carefully cultivating their foothold and building a solid base. Such companies may still be broadly diversified, offering not only production but also complementary crop‑protection services.

05

Who is in charge of selecting pesticides?

Generally speaking, when purchasing goods, the buyer calls the shots—but that doesn’t apply when farmers buy pesticides. Most farmers who go to retail outlets don’t know which product to choose; in the end, the decision rests with the retailer, who calls the shots. Of course, retailers will consult with farmers, but such formal consultations can’t change the underlying reality: the retailer still holds the final say. Moreover, some farmers simply skip buying and applying pesticides altogether, finding it too costly and time‑consuming. Instead, they turn to professional agricultural service providers. In this case, the service provider calls the shots—farmers may not even know what treatments are being applied; they just pay the bill. Doesn’t that strike you as rather unfair? Farmers foot the bill yet still have no real control over the decisions made on their behalf. In fact, we’re often even worse off than farmers when we go to the hospital: who pays for medical visits and medications? Naturally, the patient does. But do doctors consult with patients? More often than not, they prescribe without much discussion—just hand over the money and take your medicine. By contrast, our retail outlets or specialized service providers sometimes do engage in dialogue with farmers.

So the question arises: since farmers pay out of pocket and are in charge of operating retail outlets and specialized service organizations, the latter may, in pursuit of their own interests, end up harming the former—after all, they are not charities and need to turn a profit, perhaps by deliberately overcharging farmers. How can we ensure that the latter do not exploit the former? The solution is straightforward. First, fully leverage market competition. If a service provider deliberately takes advantage of farmers, the farmers can simply stop doing business with that provider and seek out a new partner. This approach works only if there are enough retail outlets and specialized service providers, competition is robust, and the transaction costs for farmers to find a new partner remain low. For example, suppose a pesticide normally costs 15 yuan, but a local retailer insists on charging 20 yuan. If farmers know that another town’s retailer sells it at the standard price of 15 yuan, will they travel to that other town to buy it? Typically not, because the cost of the trip far outweighs the 5-yuan savings. Farmers will not go to another town just to save 5 yuan; consequently, the local retailer can confidently charge an extra 5 yuan. However, if online channels for purchasing pesticides exist, farmers can shop online, which deters local retailers from arbitrarily hiking prices. In some places, out of so‑called administrative convenience, authorities seek to reduce the number of retail outlets or even ban online sales of pesticides. This reflects a typical one‑dimensional mindset: fixating on a single aspect while dismissing the whole. By the same token, socialized service organizations must also maintain adequate competition to keep service prices reasonable. Yet, when it comes to choosing which products to use, their behavior runs counter to that of retail outlets: retailers benefit from recommending expensive or heavily discounted products, whereas service organizations, given fixed service fees, stand to gain by opting for lower‑priced, lower‑cost pesticides. Second, strengthen oversight of both retail outlets and socialized service providers. Market competition alone cannot solve all problems; government regulation must complement it. Providers who recommend or directly dispense non‑targeted chemicals or counterfeit/low‑quality pesticides, or who issue prescriptions clearly exceeding reasonable levels, should face severe penalties. Without clear rules, order cannot be maintained; resolute crackdowns on illegal practices are essential to safeguarding fair market competition. Overall, the following principles should be upheld.

5.1 It is imperative to further encourage, support, and regulate professional social service organizations.

Older-generation farmers still harbor a strong attachment to farming and are willing to purchase and apply pesticides themselves. By contrast, the younger generation takes a more economically driven approach: they find that outsourcing pest‑control services is more cost‑effective than handling it on their own. As a result, socialized, specialized service organizations hold great promise; their role in selecting appropriate pesticides and implementing scientifically sound application practices is becoming increasingly evident. It is imperative to strengthen management and oversight by establishing clear qualification requirements—particularly the need for a sufficient number of qualified technical personnel—and ensuring that these entities conduct their operations in compliance with relevant laws and regulations.

5.2 It is imperative to further strengthen the management of pesticide retail outlets and enhance the professional competence of their staff.

Operators who handle diagnosis, prescription, and dispensing must possess a certain level of scientific and cultural literacy. Retail outlets must conduct their operations strictly within the bounds of laws and regulations, and routine government oversight is indispensable.

5.3 Regulate and permit, subject to restrictions, the online sale of pesticides.

Regulating pesticide sales online is challenging and has, in practice, disrupted the existing distribution landscape. However, online channels offer farmers greater convenience and introduce effective competition to brick-and-mortar outlets, aligning with broader societal trends. Attempts to impose outright bans are futile; instead, we must explore practical, viable measures to better manage and guide this evolving market.

Source: Pesticide Science and Management Issue No. 1, 2024 Author: Wu Guoqiang, Pesticide Inspection Institute, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs